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Abstract: Private constitutional rules can mitigate the Samaritan’s Dilemma, a widespread 
cause of failure of aid and humanitarian efforts. To understand how private organizations can 
adopt rules that help overcome this dilemma, I provide evidence on an association formed to 
govern poor relief in urban Chicago from the 1850s to 1880s. I show how a particular set of 
shared ethical values led to the adoption of constitutional rules governing the organization. I 
then show that these rules were specific in their ability to mitigate the Samaritan’s Dilemma 
problem inherent to administering aid. The argument advances the understanding of private 
institutional structures by demonstrating how rules can be designed in the private spheres to 
solve specific social dilemmas that plague state-led efforts to achieve similar goals. 
Keywords: aid, civil society, constitutions, entrepreneurship, ethics, Samaritans’ Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Email: Emily.Skarbek@kcl.ac.uk 
1.  Introduction  
Since 1960, Western governments have transferred roughly $5 trillion dollars of aid to the 
developing world (Easterly and Williamson 2011). Yet, despite these efforts, recipient 
countries remain impoverished. Growing evidence suggests aid has been ineffective at 
stimulating widespread economic growth.1 Aid agencies remain opaque and do little to 
monitor and measure the impact of their efforts (Easterly 2006, Easterly and Williamson 
2011). In some cases, efforts to help the poor have even ended up doing more harm than good 
(Coyne and Ryan 2009; Coyne and Williamson 2015).  
Administering humanitarian relief faces similar problems. Governments lack the 
knowledge and incentives to solve economic calculation problems and direct resources to 
where they are needed most (Sobel and Leeson 2007). State-led aid efforts to disaster stricken 
cities can increase corruption among recipient governments (Leeson and Sobel 2008, 
Yamamura 2014); create moral hazard (Shughart 2006; Sobel and Leeson 2006); encourage 
rent-seeking and free-riding (Shughart 2011); and introduce serious agency problems that can 
lead to low quality services (Henderson and Lee 2011). For these reasons, government is 
limited in its capacity to be effective and can create harmful unintended consequences 
(Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2010; Coyne 2013; Skarbek 2010).  
Failures of state-led aid efforts are perhaps the most tragic manifestations in 
contemporary political economy of what James M. Buchanan (1975) termed the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma (Pedersen 2001, Gibson et al 2005). Our desires as humans to aid others can 
undermine the recipients’ incentives to engage in productive activities. The predicament is a 
dilemma because without mitigating rules, norms, or constraints, undesirable outcomes result 
1 See Boone (1996); Brumm (2003); Brautigam & Knack (2004); Coyne and Williamson (2015); Djankov, 
Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2006); Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008); Easterly (2006); Easterly, 
Levine, and Roodman (2004); Hartford and Klein (2005); Heckelman and Knack (2008); Knack (2001); Ovaska 
(2003); Skarbek and Leeson (2009); Svensson (1999); Svensson (2000); Williamson (2008). 
                                                          
from reasoned behavior on the part of both agents. The demonstrated preference of Western 
governments to continue to give aid, independent of results, conforms to the general 
dominant strategy of the Samaritan player.  
This paper examines the institutional design principles useful for mitigating 
Samaritan’s Dilemmas in administering aid by private associations. Recent studies of bottom- 
up community resilience after disasters focus on the role of shared strategies and perceptions 
in determining cooperative efforts (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009; Chamlee-Wright 2010; 
Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2011). Constitutional rules can play an important role in shaping 
these strategies by embedding norms into general rules. However, much of the literature on 
constitutional choice typically focuses on rules as the outcomes of bargaining through 
collective action (Weingast and North 1989) or as a matter or analytical social choice 
processes (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Rawls 1971). These literatures are primarily 
concerned with public constitutions and are less concerned with the role of entrepreneurs who 
actively seek to influence the substance of rules at inception in private spheres (Buchanan 
1965; Ostrom 2005).2 This study is the first to examine the Samaritan’s Dilemma from a 
private constitutional perspective. I argue that agents with a stake in the social dilemma can 
engage in entrepreneurship over constitutional rules for administering aid. In doing so, ethical 
norms held by group members both inform and constrain rule selection.  
To examine these claims, I use a case study analysis of the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society, a private association established to administer aid in urban Chicago between 1854 
and 1887. I focus on their role in the recovery efforts following the Chicago Fire of 1871. 
Using the case study approach is most appropriate for four reasons. First, the research 
2 Recent research on private constitutional entrepreneurship has focused on extra-legal organizations. 
Seventeenth century pirates created a constitutional system of checks and balances to establish governance 
where no state was present (Leeson 2007). California prison gangs establish constitutions to define and regulate 
the internal organization of their criminal enterprises (Skarbek 2011). The use of Madisonian-style constitutions 
by gangs is well documented and consistent with past work by Charles Tilly (1985) and others. 
 
                                                          
question involves understanding how the norms and values of the members influence the 
rules selected. A detailed case study allows us to identify how participants think about both 
the problem situation and the way the rules address the needs demanded by the situation 
(Small 2009; Ostrom and Baurto 2011). Second, we are interested in looking at cases of 
large-scale aid efforts by private organizations that are comparable to state-led aid. The 
Chicago Fire was one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history (Vigdor 2008). The 
Society supplied general aid to the community before, during, and after the disaster, and thus 
we can examine how it functioned in response to a comparable crisis. A case study approach 
is necessary for examining how context shapes the strategies employed by actors within 
complex systems beyond the state-market dichotomy (Ostrom 2010a, Boettke et al 2013). 
Third, archival evidence from the Chicago Relief and Aid Society allows for analysis of their 
written constitution. Historical source materials then provide the means to evaluate the 
group’s performance and determine the relationship between the rules in form and rules in 
use. There are obvious limitations regarding the availability of data to adjudicate exactly how 
well the CRAS adhered to its constitutional rules in practice. For instance, there is no way to 
construct the counterfactual of who may have qualified for assistance but was denied. 
Nevertheless, the detail of the archival evidence and historical accounts are sufficient to 
construct an analytical narrative of the Society’s aid practices. Finally, while econometric 
methods can quantify the relative importance of constitutional factors and may assess the 
period over which constitutions matter, they have difficulties in dealing with nonlinear 
interactions among constitutional and cultural details (Tarko 2015).3 Thus, a case study 
approach is most useful for understanding the relationship between the values held by group 
members, the rules they designed, and the way the rules worked in practice. 
3 This is a specific aspect of a more general problem of understanding and assessing the importance of 
institutions using only quantitative methods. See Buchanan et al (2014) for further discussion.  
                                                          
The primary contribution of this paper is to show how private associations can design 
constitutional rules particularly suited for mitigating Samaritan's Dilemmas. The approach 
follows Ostrom (2005) and Aligica and Tarko’s (2013) framework, focusing on how values 
are imparted into rules by entrepreneurs making judgements over the problem situation and 
possible means of suppling aid. However, the novelty of this case study is the correspondence 
between the theoretical design principles identified in game theory and the actual structure 
and implementation of the private constitution. By examining how one set of institutions 
grapples with the aid dilemma at the private constitutional level, I conclude with several 
implications for why state-led efforts do not seem capable of replicating this process. 
2.  Implementing Strategic Courage in Private Associations   
Figure 1 captures the Samaritan’s Dilemma in a simple two-player game (Buchanan 1975). 
Player A is the Samaritan and player B is the aid recipient. The numbers in the cells are 
utility payoffs for the two players. The left-hand numbers indicate Player A’s payoffs and the 
right-hand numbers indicate Player B’s payoffs. Note that Player A will choose to give aid 
regardless of whether he knows he is part of a strategic game or not. Player B is not in the 
same position. His choice of action directly depends on what A does. If Player A withholds 
aid, B will exert effort. If Player A does give, however, he will withhold effort. Moreover, if 
Player B knows A’s preferences, he will always choose to shirk.   
  B 
   Effort No Effort 
A 
No Aid 2,2 1,1 
Aid 4,3 3,4 
 
The game has one Nash equilibrium outcome in the southeast quadrant. Without additional 
assumptions or exogenous rules to bind the players to a set of strategies, the Samaritan 
(Player A) will transfer resources to the other each round, without the recipient contributing 
effort to increasing overall welfare.4 Strategies for successfully mitigating the effects of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma require “strategic courage” – the purposive self-imposition of 
constraints on action that “alter the beliefs and actions of others in a direction favourable to 
the decision maker” (Schmidtchen 2002: 471).  
Implementing strategic courage requires three conditions (Schmidtchen 2002). First, 
potential Samaritans must explicitly acknowledge the strategic relationship between donor 
and recipient. Second, they have to choose rules that account for the welfare of agents in both 
the short-run and the long run. Doing so requires more than passive play on the part of 
Samaritans. Strategic courage entails adopting rules that constrain Samaritans from 
responding to their own preferences to help on a one-off basis (Buchanan 1975: 177; 
Schmidtchen 2002: 471). Third, a commitment device is necessary to bind agents ex ante to 
strategies that will prove successful over time.5 Third-party enforcement can prevent the 
Samaritans’ short-term preferences from dominating long-term interests. Because Samaritans 
have a dominant strategy to give regardless of the outcome, they will only adopt rules to 
constrain this preference if there is recognition of the gains from doing so and an incentive to 
adhere to the rules once established. 
2.2 Private Associations and Constitutional Entrepreneurship 
What types of institutional arrangements are better suited to mitigating the problems of 
strategic interaction between Samaritan and recipient? Constitutions establish general rules 
that constrain future behaviour of agents in the face of uncertainty. These limitations allow 
members to conserve on their scarce capacity to monitor the organization because it is less 
4 In the dynamic setting, Player B’s behavior lowers the aggregate payoffs to both Samaritan and recipient. See 
Buchanan (1975) for a full discussion.   
5 Concern for the enforcement of constitutional rules informs the actual choice among rules. See Vanberg (2008) 
for a discussion of how procedural constitutional rules have significant advantages over constitutional 
provisions that attempt to secure broader, substantive values. 
                                                          
costly to observe deviations from general rules than it is to calculate the sum of net benefits 
from specific actions (Sutter 1998). In this manner, they can provide a useful framework to 
guide behaviour when crises occur. Yet public and private constitutions differ in three 
important respects: owners of private associations are residual claimants of their efforts, 
private organizations face competition, and individuals self-select into private groups (Leeson 
2011). These differences mean public constitutions are less likely to remain self-enforcing 
under the pressures of time and place imposed by Samaritan’s Dilemmas. We will consider 
each of these three factors.   
First, private organizations have residual claimants on the products of the association. 
Depending on the nature and context of the organization, residual claimancy ranges from 
weak in cases where the association functions more like cooperatives (Skarbek 2011) to 
strong where the association distributes profits (Stringham 2003). Even when the residuals of 
members’ efforts are not monetary profits, closely held corporate structures mean that the 
group bears responsibility and reward for the actions it undertakes. The owners and directors 
of private associations earn esteem and reputation from their efforts at achieving club goals 
(Pettit and Brennan 2004). This allows associations to attract members and donors to their 
cause. Owners create private associations to advance their own interests and they succeed 
when they fulfil the mandate they set out to achieve. In order to achieve their ends however, 
owners and their agents have an interest in establishing effective rules for governing their 
internal organization. Without such rules, directors must exercise more costly and less 
reliable means of ensuring the success of their own enterprise.  
Compliance with the constitutional rules governing the association helps owners to 
capitalize the value of the associations’ efforts. Constitutions supply a mission statement of 
the association and are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. 
This matching economizes on the need for additional mechanisms to mitigate principle-
agency problems within the organization (Besley and Ghatak 2003). Moreover, donations 
themselves can serve as an important external mechanism for the mitigation of principle 
agent problems. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) show that even in the absence of tax advantages, 
unrestricted donations flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have 
significant influence on the decisions of the non-profit entrepreneurs. If owners or agents 
deviate from the mission and mandate of the constitution, the association will be less likely to 
attract donors, and will eventually lose reputation, esteem, and membership. 
Second, private associations compete with other organizations, firms, and 
governments to provide governance services (Leeson 2011; Skarbek 2011). Private 
associations do not have a monopoly on the provision of their services. As a result, they 
require effective governance mechanisms to enable success. Failure to meet goals in a 
competitive environment where donors choose which organizations to give to, and how 
much, will ultimately result in the inability of the organization to continue.  
Third, individuals choose to join associations voluntarily and self-select into these 
governance arrangements. Being assortive by nature, private associations tend to consist of 
people who share the same goals and accept the terms of the rules under which their actions 
will be bound (Ostrom 2010a; Leeson 2011). Otherwise, owners, directors, agents, members, 
and donors can leave or withdraw their support. Furthermore, voluntary sorting allows 
associations to discover relevant economies of scale in production and the specifics of their 
production function involved with supplying particular services (Ostrom 2010b). Where 
associations are functionally specific, such as suppliers of particular goods after disaster, the 
costs of exiting associations that do not comply with one’s preferences are lower than exit 
from private associations where competencies are more tightly bundled.   
These three key features make the constitutions of private associations self-enforcing 
and therefore relatively more effective than the public counterparts (Leeson 2011). Yet each 
feature alone does not create the conditions for establishing rules to prevent predation and 
enhance social cohesion. First, broad residual claimancy does not ensure the types of 
associations that form will be socially desirable. Violent religious extremist groups fit this 
criterion and utilize organizational advantages to produce club goods (Iannaccone and 
Berman 2006).  Second, selective association alone does not create the conditions for 
establishing rules to prevent predation and enhance social cohesion.  As Smith et al (2012) 
show in the lab, “[s]ociality appears to be the key for a group to recognize the dilemma, and 
the emergence of a leader from within the group serves the vital role of encouraging 
participants to establish their own rules of order” (2012: 27). Third, competition among 
groups, arguably the strongest of these three mechanisms, cannot alone generate the 
substantive content of private associations.  In other words, entrepreneurship over the types 
of rules seems to play a key role in determining how these three features of private 
constitutions manifest.  
3. Ethics in Private Constitutional Entrepreneurship 
Private associations face many of the same incentive problems that public institutions face in 
non-profit activity. Both lack the ability to engage in profit and loss calculation, are 
vulnerable to mission creep, and face challenges of internally structuring the bureaucracy. 
Being voluntarily assortive, competitive, and having residual claimancy, however, means the 
rule structures that private associations adopt are more likely to be self- enforcing (Ostrom et 
al 1992; Leeson 2011). This means they will tend to stable, but says nothing of the substance 
of these constitutional rules. The form and content of the rules adopted will be shaped by 
entrepreneurs where opportunities exist to shape the rules of the game at the constitutional 
stage (Martin and Thomas 2013; Thomas and Thomas, 2014). Identifying institutional 
entrepreneurs as the source of the constitutional rules allows for the examination of “any 
systematic effects of the identity and specific circumstances of the entrepreneur on the types 
of rules that are likely to emerge” (Martin and Thomas 2013: 3). 
Private constitutions will likely be more stable but experience wider variance in the 
substantive content of the rules. As a result, it is important to understand the process by 
which rule adoption and implementation may actually work in voluntary society to mitigate 
Samaritans’ Dilemmas. This section examines the case of the Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society, a private association of individuals formed with the explicit task of administering 
general aid to urban Chicago residents. Leveraging organizational assets and constitutional 
rules, the Society was remarkably successful in meeting the needs of the community after the 
fire of 1871 destroyed the city (Skarbek 2014).6 I begin with a brief overview of the Chicago 
Relief and Aid Society and the landscape in which it operated to show why it is plausible that 
the constitutional rules the Society adopted were in fact self-enforcing. Next, we examine the 
Society’s constitutional rules, both in form and in use, in light of the three criteria necessary 
for mitigating the Samaritan’s Dilemma.  
3.1 The Chicago Relief and Aid Society  
In 1850, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society (CRAS) was formed “in response to a lack of 
public responsibility to the poor: the Cook County commissioners, citing lack of funds, had 
discontinued all “outdoor” [non-institutional] relief [except medical] in 1848” (Nelson 1966). 
The Society operated periodically in response to shortfalls in public provision by the county, 
and in 1857 the State grated it formal charter, charging it as “a permanent, efficient, and 
practical mode of administering and distributing the private charities of the city of Chicago” 
6 See historical accounts supplied by Andreas (1884a and 1884b), Sawislak (1995, p. 87), Nelson (1966), Naylor 
(1975) and Reed with specific regard for African American populations (2005, p. 187). 
                                                          
(Nelson 1966, pg. 49-50). The Society’s activities remained on a small scale until 1867 when 
the association began to take on a larger role in the community (Nelson 1966: 52; Brown 
1941: 176).  
The CRAS existed amongst a wide array of charitable, social, and mutual aid 
associations. Before the 1871 fire, the Society was among many voluntary associations, 
fraternal societies and charitable institutions operating in Chicago during the period.7 These 
groups were exceptionally diverse in the purposes they served and the composition of their 
memberships. Fraternal societies such as the Knights of Pythias, Ancient Order of Good 
Fellows, the Independent Order of Sons of Malta, and B’nai B’rith supplied mutual aid to 
their members. The latter organization, for example, had 584 members living in Chicago in 
1871, and they could draw on a national network of over 25,000 members, 2,500 of which 
lived in the tri-state area (Andreas 1884a). Some associations were selective based on 
ethnicity such the Society for the Protection and Aid of German Immigrants, and most mutual 
aid societies were composed generally of members of the working class population (Andreas 
1884a).   
Amongst this diverse landscape of associations, the CRAS was distinct in aiming at 
general aid for members of the community that has fallen on hard times and needed 
temporary assistance. Unlike many aid organizations, the CRAS did not serve as insurance or 
provide mutual assistance for members. The Society specifically “conceived of the 
7 These groups included Knights of Pythias; Independent Order of Sons of Malta; United Order of Red Men; I.O 
of G.T.; Temples of Honor; Sons of Temperance; American Protestant Association; U. D. O Harugari; Strong 
Band; United Order of Good Americans; Ancient Order of Good Fellows; Independent Order of Chaldeans; 
Independent Order of Sons of Hermann;   Germans Societies; Sundry Societies; The St. George’s Benevolent 
Society; The Illinois St. Andrew’s Society; St. Patrick’s Society; The Society for the Protection and Aid of 
German Immigrants; The Independent Order of B’nai B’rith.  Specific charities included the Chicago Home for 
the Friendless, Chicago Nursery, and Half-Orphan Asylum.  In 1871, the following Labor Societies were also 
active in Chicago: Bricklayers Protective Union, Candy-makers Union, Chicago Iron Moulders [sic] Union, 
Chicago Typographical Union (No. 16), Cigar Makers Protective Union of Chicago, Curriers Union, Fireman’s 
Union, Journeyman Stonecutters Union of Chicago, Tailors Fraternal Union of Chicago, United Association of 
Marble Cutters); The Chicago Mutual Improvement Association; The Early Closing Association. See Andreas 
(1885). 
 
                                                          
community in the broadest sense,” and were explicit that “the boundaries of class, ethnicity, 
and religion...were not to play any role in the agency’s administration of benevolence” 
(Sawislak 1995, p. 89). Members believed that in domestic emergency, “charity, judiciously 
and opportunely administered, will in many instances rescue [community members] from 
permanent pauperism and save the family from being broken up’’ (CRAS 1874, p. 122). As 
such, the Society was a mission-driven organization that was not exclusive in membership. 
The bylaws stipulated that “[a]ny person my become a member of this Association by signing 
the By-Laws and paying an initiation fee of five dollars” (CRAS 1874, p. 128).  
In sum, the Society operated amongst many other voluntary associations engaged in 
similar non-profit and aid related activities. The operations of the association were sustained 
through voluntary donations made to Society members “of well-known character and 
influence” who were “designated and requested to canvass for money subscriptions, and 
other donations” (CRAS 1874, p. 129). Both members and beneficiaries of the association 
were self-selecting and there were low barriers to entry and exit.  
3.2 Recognition of the Samaritan’s Dilemma 
The founders and subsequent board members of the CRAS were a group of community elites, 
who shared beliefs in individualistic ethics (Sawislak 1995, p. 88). The Society constructed 
itself as an independent organization of prominent members of the community motivated to 
improve the lot of those who needed temporary assistance, yet committed to the idea that 
unconditional aid was morally disastrous. Directors adopted this view based on the “deeply 
held belief in the power of any able-bodied person, ultimately, to help themselves” (Sawislak 
1995, p. 89). More importantly for our purposes, board members and directors were quite 
conscious of the dilemma of giving aid.  In the words of director Ezra McCagg, supplying aid 
to “anyone who could help themselves” was “in the highest degree harmful to the person 
aided and to society at large” (quoted in Sawislak 1995, p. 88).  
Historian Karen Sawislak, describes the CRAS as “internally at war between a form 
of humanitarianism and conservative impulses” leading to a mandate whereby “the Society 
incorporated a seeming schizophrenia of purpose: the agency existed to give, but its directors 
remained ever fearful of the harm that their giving might do” (1995, p. 90). The first formal 
rule of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society’s constitutional charter reflects this mission:   
“The object of this Society is to aid such of the poor as through sickness or 
other misfortune require temporary assistance.  The permanently dependent 
are not regarded as proper subjects, because if they should be relieved, the 
entire funds of the association would soon be exhausted in the support of a 
permanent list.” 
This primary statement of purpose is significant in that it is a clear recognition of the strategic 
interdependency of the behaviour between Samaritans and recipients in the aid context. 
Continuous aid can undermine the incentives of the recipients to engage in the types of 
productive activity the Samaritans seek to encourage. By formalizing this concern in the 
associations’ mission and first constitutional rule, the CRAS conditioned its practice of 
charity on an ethic of individual responsibility that made explicit the concern for possible 
negative long-run consequences of aid. 
3.3 Choice of Aid Rationing Rules  
With the explicit recognition of strategic interdependence of behaviour between aid 
administrators and recipients, the original CRAS constitutional document included eleven 
other rules aimed to structure the governance of aid distributions.8  In the midst of the relief 
effort following the Chicago Fire of 1871, directors codified a practice that began in the days 
8 The CRAS also had a set of ten by-laws which stipulated the internal procedural rules governing membership, 
election of the offices, and duty of the offices of Secretary, Board of Directors, and Executive Committee 
(CRAS 1874: 128-129).  
                                                          
following the fire as their thirteenth constitutional rule (see Appendix). In total, these rules 
were general in applicability, designed to guard against the potential for free-riding in the 
distribution of aid to community members, and intended to mitigate the potential for moral 
hazard to result from aid distributions. Each rule was consistent with the underlying ethics 
informing the organization and the guiding principle to attempt to align the short-run and 
long-run incentives of both Samaritans and recipients.  
The Society held strong views concerning who merited aid, but they did not base their 
criteria on race, ethnicity, social class, or religion.  Deserving poor included the elderly and 
infirm, those injured or in need of temporary assistance, widows, children and families for 
whom the primary caregiver was absent. Able-bodied, working age males were not regarded 
as proper subjects for relief. The CRAS exercised due process of consideration to any 
applicant and “regarded [each] as entitled to charity until a careful examination proves the 
contrary” (Rule 2, Appendix). Healthy males requesting aid fell under the stipulations 
provided by rules seven and thirteen, and were “furnished employment directly by the 
Superintendent, or sent to reliable employment agents, which whom the Society cooperates” 
(Rule 7, Rule 13 Appendix).  This was consistent with their commitment to only providing 
temporary assistance, and relief would be “discontinued to those who manifest a purpose to 
depend on alms rather than their own exertions for support” (Rule 5, CRAS 1871). These 
rules established general criteria for who qualified for assistance and how the Society would 
treat applicants.  
Other rules within the Society’s constitution aimed at defining and enforcing the 
scope of the Society’s activities so as not to incentivize people outside the community to free 
ride on the organizations resources. Rule six states, “Destitute persons sent from other cities 
should be referred to the County Agent, to be sent to their former residence. Should we 
undertake the support of such persons it would be offering a premium to other cities to send 
their poor to us to be supported” (Rule 6, Appendix). In everyday operation, this typically 
meant preventing drifters from making claims on community resources (Andreas 1884a). 
After the fire, the immigrants entering the city typically had little trouble finding work. For 
those that did not find employment, they would not be capable of meeting the requirements 
for community verification for assistance from the CRAS.9  
As for members of the community receiving significant benefits from other charitable 
institutions, rule eight stipulated “[a]pplicants having claims on other charities are to 
furnished with a card directing them to the same” (Rule 7, Appendix).  This rule was most 
important during normal operations, as the Society was aiming to help only those who were 
not covered by other mutual aid arrangements and required temporary assistance. After the 
fire, “the Relief and Aid Society transformed itself into a social welfare giant” (Sawislak 
1995, p. 92). Of the nearly $4.5 million [1871] dollars donated to the city, nearly half of 
Chicago’s pre-fire population would receive some benefit from the CRAS. In many cases, the 
Society utilized pre-existing networks of independent voluntary societies to delegate 
responsibility and to limit duplication of services.  
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHICS OF AID AFTER CHICAGO FIRE OF 1871   
  
Population by Birth 
1870 
Total Families 
Aided 
As a Percentage of 
Total Population of 
Cook County 
As a 
Percentage of 
Total Aid 
German 14,816 18% 38% 
Irish 11,623 12% 30% 
American 4,823 52% 12% 
Scandinavian 3,624 4% 9% 
English 1,406 3% 4% 
Negro 600 1% 2% 
Bohemian 565 2% 1% 
Scotch 526 1% 1% 
9 The County operated an almshouse and insane asylum, but its operating budgets were comparably quite small 
and they were notoriously mismanaged and corrupt (Brown 1941: 81, 120). 
                                                          
Source: Andreas (1884b: 613) 
Examining the distribution of relief, aid clearly went to those populations most 
affected by the fire. Table 1 shows the distribution of total aid by population in relation to the 
pre-fire demographics. German and Irish immigrant populations constituted the majority of 
residents living in the most heavily burnt out North Division. German immigrants were the 
largest ethnic concentration, 18% of the pre-fire urban population, yet they received 38% of 
the total aid distributed. Similarly, Irish populations comprised 12% of the pre-fire population 
and received 30% of aid. Minority populations primarily residing in other areas of the city 
affected by the fire were aided, but the aid given was more closely calibrated to the damage 
they suffered. For example, African American residents made up 1% of the city population 
before the fire and primarily resided in the South of the city. In total, they received 2% of the 
aid administered by the Chicago Relief and Aid Society. African American historian Reed 
(2005, p. 187), reports that ‘‘[t]he African American community suffered, but in regard to 
physical damage, it suffered disproportionately less than the rest of the city.’’ Only the 
native-born population, whose residential patterns were less clustered in the areas destroyed 
by fire, received less aid proportionate to their pre-fire populations. Historical editorials and 
press include accounts of disgruntled applicants and rude treatment on the part of officers of 
the Society, but there is little evidence to suggest systematic neglect or gross duplication of 
services (Andreas 1884b; Sawislak 1995). Consistent with this pattern are the findings of an 
investigation by the Chicago City Council in 1875 that ‘‘found no evidence of partiality or 
prejudice on account of nationality of religion’’ and concluded, ‘‘the whole business had 
been faithfully and wisely administered’’ (CRAS 1875, p. 6; also Brown 1941, p. 119). In 
sum, “[a] profoundly individualistic ethos suffused the standards set by a largely self-made 
entrepreneurial elite” and informed their efforts both in establishing rules to govern aid as 
well as the actual practice of administering relief (Sawislak 1995, p. 91). To understand how 
these rules worked in practice, we now turn to examine their rules in operation.  
3.4 Community Verification and Enforcement 
Chicago Relief and Aid Society workers awarded aid to applicants based on a system 
of community authentication and third party decision making. Volunteers and workers would 
read applicants’ claims and determine how well they fit the pre-existing criteria in light of 
recommendations by the applicant’s peers and associates.10 Anyone applying for aid would 
need to put forward their reputation and have these claims verified by other people in their 
neighborhood. To see the mechanisms at work, we will consider how the Society screened 
labor and processed claims for resources, housing, transportation, and supplies.   
The CRAS constitution aimed to distinguish between proper recipients of aid and 
able-bodied men. Rules seven and thirteen pledged to help the latter by assisting them in 
finding employment. Evidence suggests that the Society actively pursued this commitment 
using community enforcement to validate claims. After the fire of 1871, the superintendent of 
operations announced, “[a]ny man, single woman, or boy, able to work and unemployed at 
this time, is so from choice and not from necessity” (CRAS 1874, pg. 158).  The CRAS 
helped to establish a labor exchange in the center of the burnt district, where people in need 
of labor could find those seeking employment. Superintendents assigned to districts 
throughout the city sent all able-bodied men who applied for aid to the labor exchange and 
issued them a ticket. Once at the labor exchange, the recipient could find work from what was 
on offer. The ticket issued to him “became a certificate of character” (CRAS 1874: 272). If he 
found labour, he handed back the ticket at the exchange and it was returned to the 
superintendent that issued it. If the ticket was not presented at the exchange, and thus not 
10 Agents of the Society were volunteers up until the fire of 1871, where in expanding their aid efforts, the 
Society took to paying those who were working on their behalf. See CRAS 1871. 
                                                          
returned to the Superintendent, “it was pre-emptive evidence that the bearer preferred to eat 
the bread of idleness rather than work” (CRAS 1874: 272). If the recipient returned for aid, 
the district superintendent would reject his claim. On the other hand, if having obtained work 
– of which returning the ticket was evidence – he asked again for relief, the CRAS would 
inquire into his situation. “This check upon imposition served its purpose admirably, though 
it was no more than common justice to say that to shirk work and live upon charity by 
preference was the exception and not the rule among the labouring people of Chicago” 
(CRAS 1874: 273).  
With the exodus from the city immediately after the fire, the labor supply was greatly 
reduced while demand for both skilled and unskilled labor increased dramatically.  Not only 
was there a great deal of work available, the wages for even unskilled labor increased 
dramatically during the months following the disaster.11 Even as rebuilding was well 
underway, most wages stayed equal or slightly above the pre-fire rates (Sawislack 1995, p. 
183). According to historians, it was precisely this means of aid by the CRAS that “gave 
voice to prevailing ideologies...[and] signalled the Society’s intense commitment to the 
promotion of working-class self-support. This set of values, joined with the truism that 
anyone who wanted work could in fact find a job, lay beneath all agency policy” (Sawislak 
1995, p. 93). 
Rule six of the constitution in practice also concerned the operation of railway 
transportation after disaster. In the first two weeks following the 1871 fire, the Society 
worked with the railroads to extend free passes to all that sought to leave downtown Chicago 
or travel back-and-forth. The strategy was remarkably effective in the immediacy of the fire, 
11 Andreas (1884b) reports claims of price gouging and exorbitant wages for labourers undertaking tasks of 
clearing debris and hauling waste.  Other commentary at the time lamented the fact that higher wages were 
attracting immigrants into the city to work and profit from the higher prices of labor.  
                                                          
allowing people to leave the city, find family, and means of accommodation.12  After two 
weeks, the Society moved to a policy of rationing the passes they subsidized to the “aged, 
sick, and feeble, to women and children, and to large families” (CRAS 1894, page 20). The 
practice was a consistent application of the criterion for qualifying for aid and the idea that 
“there [was] employment enough in Chicago for all who were willing to work” (CRAS 1894, 
page 20).   
One challenge facing the relief effort was housing the homeless populations and re-
establishing rightful claims to property where nothing but ashes stood in place of homes. At 
the time, “Chicago was one of the few American cities with high rates of working class home 
ownership” (Sawislak 1995, p. 310). The fire destroyed the country office where land titles 
were recorded, leaving little official record of much of the burnt out property. As such, aiding 
those under the mandate of the CRAS also meant, in part, helping to restore legitimacy to 
previous homeowners. For moral and practical reasons, the Society built two types of basic 
homes: one for families of three persons and a slightly larger model for families of more than 
three persons, whom either owned or rented their homes prior to the fire. The Society then 
built larger barracks to house renters and tenement dwellers that did not have claim to 
ownership before the fire.  
The majority of applicants were working class families who received the raw 
materials from the CRAS and constructed the homes themselves. For widows, the elderly or 
the infirm, homes were built for the applicants by the volunteers of the committee. Each 
house came complete with a stove, crockery, utensils, table, chairs, bed frame and bedding. 
To verify property claims the CRAS relied on personal references and sent volunteers from 
the neighbourhood to investigate questionable requests.   
12 By one account, some 20,000 of the 100,000 homeless left the city in the first few days after the fire (Account 
of Sidney Gay in Sheahan and Upton, The Great Conflagration, pg 331; See also footnote 99 of  Sawislak 1995, 
p. 94. Another estimate puts the numbers between 20,000 - 30,000 people (See Andreas 1884b). 
                                                          
Lawrence Saddler, for example, applied for materials to construct a temporary 
building in place of the home he lost in the fire. His application notes his employment as a 
skilled tailor, his family of six, and his property claim. Along with the application, Saddler 
included letters of support from a local merchant attesting to Saddler as ‘‘an honest, upright 
man and worthy of credit and confidence’’ and his local pastor (CRAS Saddler 
Correspondence 1872a-d). These testimonies verified his claims by drawing on local 
knowledge of community members.  A volunteer from Saddler's neighborhood thus approved 
his application. Historical accounts and archival evidence support the idea that the system of 
community testimony and verification was effective at detecting cases of fraud. Sawislak 
(1995) is critical of the CRAS precisely because they were discerning in aid disbursements 
according to the criteria of the organization. Moreover, records show people attempting to 
forge letters of support only to have members of the Society visit the property and conclude 
they were lying (CRAS Moran Correspondence 1872a- d). 
The results were directly visible to residents. Within one month 5,226 single-family 
homes were constructed to house at least 30,000 people. By 1873, the CRAS had provisioned 
for just over 8,000 single-family homes. An editorial published in the Chicago Tribune less 
than a month after the fire heralded the CRAS housing policy: “With this plan, 30,000 
people, hitherto householders, will still be in their own homes, surrounded by the sacred and 
conservative elements of family, of independence, of respectability, and of individual 
responsibility which are so immense a moral force in the community” (Chicago Tribune, 
November 3, 1871; also quoted in Sawislak 1995, p. 95).  
The strongest evidence of the Society abiding by their rules in practice involves their 
role as residual claimants to the donations given to the association and the actions undertaken 
in this capacity. As early as four months after the fire, the president and chairman of 
executive committee of the RAS issued the following statement to the press: 
“The continued donations since our last report, together with the twenty days 
of mild weather in January, enable us to say that the resources of the Chicago 
Relief and Aid Society will meet the wants of the present winter.  By 
resources we mean not only what we have actually received, but various sums 
of which we have been advised….We regard it as a duty to make this 
announcement the earliest day that it could be made with reasonable assurance 
of its correctness.  We can also say that there will be enough to make 
temporary provision for our charitable institutions whose resources were cut 
off by the fire” (Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1872).  
For a private organization reliant on donations and in the midst of a large-scale relief effort, a 
public declaration for people to stop sending money appears counterintuitive. The residual 
claimancy of the organization helps to explain what otherwise looks like irrational behaviour. 
The members of the Society not only retained the donations received but this was legitimate 
only as far as they abided by their constitutional mandate. The expressed purpose of the 
CRAS was to provide general, temporary aid. To supply more assistance than what was 
necessary to get people back in homes and at work would constitute a violation of their 
mission. Thus this dual mandate to supply aid, but only temporarily, required that publicly 
they not ask for more than needed and not spend more than necessary to accomplish their 
goals.  
To this end, six months after the fire the CRAS removed 800 families from its weekly 
aid rations (Sawislak 1995, p. 117). Politically, this was widely unpopular. The Cook County 
board of Commissioners issued a public statement condemning the Society and claiming they 
held “a sum exceeding a million dollars” while taking action that was “not in keeping with 
the object of the fund” (Cook County Board of Commissioners, 1872). The Board of 
Commissioners introduced a resolution to attempt to confiscate the donations held by the 
Society. Yet, by the CRAS ruled these families were entitled to aid after the fire, but not to 
ongoing relief for fear of abetting “permanent pauperism.” The Society responded to the 
allegations by publicly reminding the city of the rights and responsibilities conferred to the 
organization by their corporate charter. The charter legally barred the organization from 
relinquishing the donations the city and mandated they account for every cent received and 
spent by the organization (Sawislak 1995, p. 119). Publicly available accounts for the 
organization confirmed they only held a balance of $600,000 at the time and the corporate 
status of the organization muted the Board of Commissioners efforts to confiscate the 
donations.  When the CRAS closed the books to the “Special Relief Period” 18 months after 
the fire, the organization had more than a $500,000 surplus.  
From 1867 to 1870, the Chicago Relief and Aid Society aided between 1,363 – 1,560 
families per year, dispersing an average of $23 to $27 dollars of aid per family (CRAS 1874; 
Nelson, 1966: 55). In the aftermath of the fire, operations increased to serve nearly 40,000 
families with an average aid package amounting to $96.50 of aid per family. By mid-1873, 
86.5 % fewer families were receiving relief from the Society, having found employment and 
the wherewithal to support their families (Skarbek 2014: 166 and 171; Andreas 1884b). The 
Chicago Relief and Aid Society scaled back their efforts and returned to a much smaller level 
of operation similar to their pre-fire efforts. The organization continued to operate in 
accordance with their constitution up through 1884, aiding the needy though temporary 
assistance.  
In documenting comparative long-term recovery of major cities hit by large-scale 
natural disasters, Vigdor (2008) cites Chicago after the 1871 fire as a primary example of a 
city that effectively rebounded.  By 1880, the urban environment was completely anew, not 
only with “homes for the 100,000 [previously homeless] inhabitants, it had also welcomed 
200,000 new residents, bringing its total population to more than half a million” (Vigdor 
2008: 136). Chicago rapidly returned to its pre-fire population growth trajectory of a booming 
commercial city.  
By establishing mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement that utilized a wide 
cross section of the population, the Society could take advantage of third-party information to 
ration aid disbursements. Members and directors who were Samaritan’s put in place a system 
whereby individuals disbursements decisions were not of their discretion but of those with 
local knowledge of circumstance. With claims to property and resources monitored by fellow 
community members, the process of dispersing aid was a credible enforcement strategy 
relying on local knowledge of circumstance. 
4. Conclusion 
This analysis offers three general implications for the problem of administering aid. 
First, private associations have an incentive to supply governance when they hold assets that 
stand to appreciate as a result of supplying that governance. The Chicago Relief and Aid 
Society was comprised of members of the community who had personal and business 
interests tied to the city (Skarbek 2014). Members enhanced their reputation by supplying 
community relief consistent with prevailing ideological norms about aid. After the fire 
destroyed their commercial businesses, taking control of administering a large-scale relief 
effort was consistent with their organizational mandate, personal reputational capital, and 
private commercial business interests. However, in order for the incentive to supply 
governance to lead better aid practices, Samaritans have to have a real stake in the outcomes 
for the aid recipients. This will vary with context, but often means a more localized scale of 
aid efforts and a closer relationship between aid givers and receivers. Both of these 
implications challenge prevailing aid practices amongst Western governments and 
multilateral aid organizations.  
Second, the private corporate charter of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society was the 
institutional means by which the organization was able to adopt a relatively self-enforcing 
constitutional structure. This institutional form meant the association was local to the 
community, privately managed, and had to operate with the voluntary consent of donors, 
members, and recipients. These characteristics afforded the organization the ability to 
experiment with rules consistent with their normative views about aid at the constitutional 
level. The corporate charter required members to be residual claimants on the efforts of the 
organization, both protecting donations from local government appropriation and providing 
an incentive for aid allocation in accordance with the rules. Furthermore, the charter 
introduced a mandate for transparency in the aid process that allowed the CRAS to operate 
with greater community legitimacy and accountability. These features are attenuated or 
absent in state-led efforts, and thus deserve greater attention as potential sources of 
institutional robustness (Pennington 2010; 2013).   
Third, the ethics informing the constitutional rules may matter less in specifying the 
exact content of the rules, and more in restricting a feasible set and defining the space in 
which entrepreneurs may discover both compatible rules and mechanisms for implementing 
aid practices. In the case study above, a crucial step at the constitutional level was the explicit 
recognition of the potential strategic interdependence between Samaritan and recipient. This 
identification was feasible because of prevailing ideological views concerning charity and 
aid. The mechanisms adopted to mitigate this dilemma were then discovered within the 
context of the problem situation. Approaching the relationship between ethics and rules in 
this way complements findings that suggest culture may have a causal effect on economic 
development (Tabellini 2010), but through an indirect channel of shaping people’s ideas of 
what constitutes prudent, beneficent, and just means of structuring aid and exchange 
relationships (Easterly 2014; McCloskey 2010).  
 
Appendix: Constitution of the Chicago Relief and Aid Society 
Rule 1.  The object of this Society is to aid such of the poor as through sickness or other 
misfortune require temporary assistance.  The permanently dependent are not regarded as 
proper subjects, because if they should be relieved, the entire funds of the association would 
soon be exhausted in the support of a permanent list. 
Rule 2.  Each applicant for relief is regarded as entitled to charity until a careful examination 
proves the contrary. 
Rule 3.  Relief is only to be given after a personal investigation of each case by visitation and 
inquiry by the Superintendent or authorized visitor. 
Rule 4.  Necessary articles in small quantities to be given, and only in proportion to 
immediate need. 
Rule 5.  Relief to be discontinued to those who manifest a purpose to depend on alms rather 
than their own exertions for support. 
Rule 6.  Destitute persons sent from other cities should be referred to the County Agent, to be 
sent to their former residence.  Should we undertake the support of such persons it would be 
offering a premium to other cities to send their poor to us to be supported. 
Rule 7.  Able-bodied men are not regarded as proper subjects for relief, but will be furnished 
employment directly by the Superintendent, or sent to reliable employment agents, which 
whom the Society cooperates. 
Rule 8.  Applicants having claims on other charities are to furnished with a card directing 
them to the same. 
Rule 9.  It is an absolute condition of relief by this Society that all persons receiving aid are 
not to ask alms or assistance of the pubic, either on the street, at residences, or places of 
business. 
Rule 10.  No loans shall be made from the funds of the Society. 
Rule 11.  As a rule, relief to be administered in supplies rather than money. 
Rule 12.  Subscribers to the funds of the Society are entitled to send persons applying to them 
for relief to the rooms of the Society, and will be furnished with cards for that purpose. 
Rule 13.  In all cases where families or personal have been aided by this Society through a 
winter, on account of want of employment, and are by us offered situation either in the city or 
country, adapted to their condition in life, with aid to reach such situations, which they refuse 
to accept, no further relief shall be extended to them.   
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